Swarthmore College

Works
Economics Faculty Works

Economics

2003

Review Of "Economic Efficiency In Law And Economics" By R.O.
Zerbe
Mark Kuperberg
Swarthmore College, mkuperb1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Mark Kuperberg. (2003). "Review Of "Economic Efficiency In Law And Economics" By R.O. Zerbe". Journal
Of Economic Literature. Volume 41, Issue 1. 222-223.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/21

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

American Economic Association

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics by Richard O. Zerbe,
Review by: Mark Kuperberg
Source: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 222-223
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3217403
Accessed: 21-09-2017 15:58 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Journal of Economic Literature

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 21 Sep 2017 15:58:53 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

222 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (March 2003)
construction may be a reaction to individualistic

zation that aids knowledge (though subject to er-

rational choice theory. Now human cognition

rors both great and small).

does not make us very good natural logicians or

We act on the basis of representations; to ananatural statisticians, but we are remarkably effec- lyze the actions of others we construct representive at making sense by making patterns, and we
tations of their representations. White is well
are usually strongly motivated to create patterns
aware of this, and organizes his discussion and
designs his models accordingly. Both deserve
and use them as a basis for action (economists as
much as any group); moreover, the similarity becareful consideration and a fair trial.

tween human brains facilitates the adoption of
other people's patterns to supplement our
own-for individual comprehension even before
co-ordination.
White neglects Knight's observation that we
group phenomena by similarities while ignoring
differences that are deemed irrelevant. Now, as
Popper observed, any such grouping implies a

point of view, and points of view may differ.
Adam Smith realized that the division of labor
encouraged a variety of viewpoints, thus making
better use of our collective capacity for pattern
making. Different contexts of similarity produce
different interpretative systems, cultures and
subcultures, on which White relies-and also disputed interpretations, paradigm shifts, and misguided consensus such as the vision of the telecoms market that produced the history of
WorldCom and its peers; within a market they
may produce the developing capabilities and perceptions of productive opportunities that characterize a Penrosian firm, and so explain, as White
does not, the alignment of firms with market
niches. A treatment of capabilities, including
transaction capabilities (on which Mark Casson
has focused) is a natural complement to White's
scheme.

The selective connections in that scheme find
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University of Stirling
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By By
Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. Cheltenham, U.K., and
Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by
American International Distribution Corpora-

tion, Williston, Vt., 2001. Pp. v, 328. $95.00,
cloth; $35.00, paper. ISBN 1-84064-301-3,
cloth; 1-84064-611-X, pbk. JEL 2002-0046
This is a very ambitious book with a rather unpretentious title. The reader gets some inkling
that this is no garden variety law and economics
text when Zerbe introduces the concept of KHZ
efficiency, as in Kaldor-Hicks-Zerbe efficiency.
KHZ efficiency is the central organizing concept
of the book, and the book's worth stands or falls
on the usefulness of this concept.
Before exploring KHZ efficiency in depth,
Zerbe has a nice discussion of the distinctions between equivalent variation, compensating variation, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept,

and a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency.
Zerbe also makes a useful distinction between

transaction costs that relate to changing legal
rules and transaction costs that relate to the
transfer of entitlements under existing legal
rules. Only the latter count in determining

a natural complement in the selective connections that constitute knowledge-and it is knowl- whether an existing legal rule is efficient. That is,
edge that orders information. Knowledge is con- a legal rule is inefficient if there exists an alternajecture and therefore provisional; its reliability is tive rule which will more likely result in entitlea crucial issue for the effectiveness and durabilityments going to higher valued users. It is irreleof any of the markets discussed by White. It is vant for this determination if transaction costs
prevent this alternative rule from being adopted.
notable that Ziman (1978, Reliable Knowledge,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000,
Real Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), in appraising the reliability of scientific
knowledge, links human cognition to intersubjectivity and consensibility, and emphasizes
the importance of structures, norms, commitment, and processes, thus providing both similarities and contrasts to the operation of markets.
White's production markets are a form of organi-

This is important because otherwise all existing
legal rules would be efficient tautologically.

As for KHZ efficiency, it is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency writ large, very large. The underlying
premise is that anything that anyone is willing to

pay for should be considered a good, and that the
appropriate cost-benefit analysis is one that sums
up willingness to pay for all of these "goods." This
seemingly simple premise resolves in a formal
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way many of the conundrums that bedevil cost-

atic in that it is questionable whether any system

benefit analysis and law and economics. It is the

with so little a priori input can ever give satisfac-

ultimate working out of the tradition in law and

tory answers. At a theoretical level, general equi-

economics that Richard Posner called "wealth

librium theory takes endowments (or entitle-

maximization."

ments) as given a priori, and trade proceeds from

For example, should compensation be paid to

there. General equilibrium theory does not at-

losers or is the potential to pay compensation, as in tempt to bootstrap the distribution of endow-

Kaldor-Hicks, sufficient for a change to pass the

ments from within itself.

cost-benefit test? The answer for Zerbe depends

In a related point, Zerbe claims that KHZ effi-

upon whether the population as a whole has a pos-

ciency does not suffer from the Scitovsky Para-

itive willingness to pay compensation to losers. If

dox, but this is unlikely. KHZ, after all, is simply a

the population is willing to pay for a compensation

voting system where votes are weighted by will-

system, then paying compensation is KHZ effi-

ingness to pay. As such, it cannot escape Arrow's

cient and not paying compensation would be KHZ

Impossibility Theorem, and intransitivities are
likely to arise. "Regard for others" exacerbates

inefficient. Zerbe puts such feelings, backed by
dollars, into a category called "regard for others."

this problem. One need get no more technical

The "regard for others" category, however, has

than the "Gift of the Magi" to realize the para-

much wider implications than resolving the comdoxes that can emerge when I am willing to pay
to make you happy and you are willing to pay to
pensation conundrum. Consider the difficulty
presented for wealth maximization by the fact
make me happy.
While Zerbe does not claim that KHZ is a
that some people are willing to pay for the right
to commit bad acts. According to KHZ, the effi- moral system, "regard for others" has the potenciency of prohibiting such acts depends upon the tial to ride roughshod over any sense of individculprit's willingness to pay versus the victim and
ual autonomy. Under KHZ, I have no more right
to determine what I may do than others have in
everyone else's need to accept payment. Zerbe
rightly notes that bad acts are less likely to pass a determining what I may do. The only constraint
KHZ test than a traditional cost-benefit test since on "busy-body" tastes is that the busy bodies may
everyone, and not just the victim, gets to weigh inbe too cheap to pay for their tastes. Clearly, the
on the question.
system could be improved by reasonable a priori
But, what about acts that some people conlimits on what tastes can count.
MARK KUPERBERG
sider bad and others do not-such as homosexuality? Well, that also gets put up for a KHZ vote.
Swarthmore College
So, if more people are willing to pay to prohibit
homosexual acts than homosexuals and civil lib-

ertarians need to be paid to accept such a prohibition, then homosexuality is inefficient. As
Zerbe notes, KHZ efficiency is completely dependent on the population's values-it is not an
independent standard of what is right. KHZ is

only as moral as the sentiments of the people.
Zerbe claims that the strength of KHZ is its
practicality in that it provides a mechanism to de-

E Macroeconomics and Monetary
Economics

Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan.

By Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison,
and Takatoshi Ito. Cambridge and London:
MIT Press, 2000. Pp. viii, 196. $27.95. ISBN

0-262-03285-6. JEL 2001-0977

This book is the sequel to the authors' 1997
cide what the society wants. It aspires to no
book, The Political Economy of Japanese Monegreater claim of objective truth than this. Yet, one
can question whether such a wide-ranging surveytary Policy (MIT Press), which examined the development of the central banking and financial
of everyone's willingness to pay is practicable.
system in Japan from the 1950s to the 1990s. The
One virtue of traditional cost-benefit analysis is
that by limiting the calculations to those immedi- authors started working on this sequel shortly be-

ately affected by a project, it limits the universe
of sentiments that must be sampled.
Aside from practicality, KHZ and wealth maximization are morally and theoretically problem-

fore the publication of the first book. They knew
that the new Bank of Japan Act would be implemented in April 1998, and planned to analyze the
impact of the institutional reform on monetary
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